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An irony of the age of reproductive technology is that genes have
gained symbolic importance and legal weight at the same time that
we have acquired the ability to manipulate, alter, and exchange them.
One manifestation of genes’ increased importance is the increasing
commitment—again, in both law and culture—to genes as the
essence, the sine qua non, the definitional element of parenthood. This
commitment, which I refer to as genetic essentialism,1 has proceeded
apace despite, and in seeming contradiction with, the commodification
of reproduction, complete with markets in eggs and sperm. Neoliberal
culture, however, does not necessarily register degradation when genes
are bought and sold. Markets, competition, and high prices confirm
rather than diminish value, if not of the genes themselves than of the
owners. To be a parent is increasingly defined as having either
produced the gametes or paid for them. “Genetic essentialism” thus
refers primarily to the definition of parenthood in terms of genes, but
it also encompasses genes’ alienability and the consequent fungibility.
Lost in these developments are definitions of parenthood on terms
other than genes and contract. My particular concern is the sidelining
of gestation as a fundamental form of parenthood. Peruse the legal
literature and you will find the term “biological parent” used almost
†

Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Juvenile and Family Law
Program at University of Colorado Law School.

1.

Cf. Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive
Technologies: ARTs, Mistakes, Sex, Race, and Law, 12 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 4 (2003) (“Genetic essentialism asserts that our genes
and our DNA are the essence, the core, the most important constituent
part of who we are as human beings; therefore genetics should
overpower any other factor when defining biological parenthood. Genetic
essentialism reduces human beings to the contents of our cells. It ignores
the ways our cells and environments interrelate, the ways our
physiological system functions as a whole organism, and the ways our
minds
and
hearts
affect
our
being.
Additionally, genetic
essentialism renders all our ways of nurturing and being nurtured by one
another for naught.”).
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exclusively as a synonym for “genetic parent,” as if biology required
no more than an egg and a sperm to pop a child into existence.2
This essay explores some of the costs of relying on genetic
essentialism in family law. It first critiques proposals to adopt genetic
essentialism in its strongest form: mandatory genetic testing of every
child at birth, with genes defining parenthood unless a contract says
otherwise. The essay then suggests an alternative way of thinking
about biological parenthood, less as proposal than as counterweight,
demonstrating that the choice of genetic essentialism is ideological,
not scientific, and that it carries with it substantial costs.

I.

Mandatory Genetic Parenthood?

Many legal scholars have argued that parenthood should be
defined in terms of genes, but the most extended case for mandatory
genetic testing comes from Mary Pat Byrn and Jeannette Ives in their
article Which Came First, the Parent or the Child?3 Byrn and Ives

2.

See R. Alto Charo, Biological Determinism in Legal Decision Making:
The Parent Trap, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 265, 293 n. 149 (2004) (“A
majority of American courts, newspapers, and academic commentators
already use ‘natural’ or ‘biological’ when referring to the ‘genetic’
mother. [examples omitted…] This should not be surprising because
many of these judges and commentators are men whose only possible
biological links are genetic.”). See, e.g., William J. Giacomo & Angela
DiBiasi, Mommy (and Daddy) Dearest, 87 N.Y. STATE BAR J. 18, 18
(2015) (“By this surrogacy arrangement, the egg donor and Sherri
Shepherd’s husband are the biological parents—they each have a genetic
tie to the resulting child.”); Charles P. Kindregan & Danielle White,
International Fertility Tourism: The Potential for Stateless Children in
Cross-Border Commercial Surrogacy Arrangements, 36 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 527, 550 (2013) (referring to “genetic (biological)
parents”); Rebecca Mae Salokar, Gay and Lesbian Parenting in Florida:
Family Creation Around the Law, 4 F.I.U. L. REV. 473, 492 n. 121
(2009) (“The biological parent is one who is genetically related to the
child as a result of conception using that person’s egg or sperm.”); Usha
Rengachary Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International
Surrogacy Between the United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15,
35 (2008) (referring to “genetic (biological) parents”); Anthony Miller,
Baseline, Bright-Line, Best Interests: A Pragmatic Approach for
California to Provide Certainty in Determining Parentage, 34
MCGEORGE L. REV. 637, 698–99 (2003) (referring to “genetic-biological
parents” in contrast to “surrogate” mothers). But see Duane R. Valz,
Review of Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive
Technologies, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 201, 207 (1995) (“In theory, for
example, a child could end up with three biological parents (a genetic
mother, genetic father, and a gestational mother.”).

3.

Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik Ives, Which Came First, the Parent
or the Child?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 338–39 (2010); see also June
Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent—
Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Uncertainty, 11 WM. & MARY
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make powerful arguments based on the best interests of children.4 A
regime of mandatory testing, however, would face substantial
practical problems, which in turn point to defects in the ideology of
genetic essentialism.5
Having echoed in their title the classic chicken-or-egg question,
Byrn & Ives answer their own question by concluding that the child
comes first, then the parent.6 This answer treats the child’s existence
as a fact while treating “parent” as a status assigned by law.7 To be a
child is merely to exist as a young human being—it can be done in
isolation—while being a parent inherently consists of being in relation
to another person, the child; parenthood entails rights and
responsibilities toward children, created by operation of law, while
childhood is merely the early phase of life. The child thus “comes
first,” existentially or at least legally alone.
Because the child is alone, Byrn and Ives argue that the state, as
parens patriae, has a constitutional duty to provide for the child’s
care and rearing.8 It does so through the legal category “parent.”
They further conclude that the people most likely to act in the child’s
best interests—and thus the people whom the state is obligated to
recognize as legal parents—are the genetic parents of a child
conceived through sexual intercourse and the intended parents of a
child conceived through alternative reproductive technology.9 A
L. REV. 1011, 1067–70 (2003) (proposing mandatory paternity testing,
with limited waivers, at birth).
4.

Byrn & Ives, supra note 3, at 322–24.

5.

I use ideology in the sense of a guiding narrative, a sense which is not
necessarily derogatory. The alternative narrative of reproduction that I
outline below is also an ideology. Cf. STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, Law and ideology (“Ideology refers, in a general sense, to a
system of political ideas.”).

6.

Byrn & Ives, supra note 3, at 342.

7.

Id. at 307.

8.

Id. at 324–27.

9.

Id. at 343. Of course, the attribution of parental status is not based
solely on the “best interests of the child,” the familiar test for custodial
determinations in family law. There are other policies at stake, and the
child’s interests are only one piece. Moreover, the child is not entitled to
the best possible parents. When Byrn and Ives argue that the state
must assign as parents the “people most likely” to look out for the
child’s best interests, id. at 342-43, they do not suggest an individual
evaluation of a person’s potential merits as a parent to a particular
child. Rather, the state must assign parenthood according to a rule that
in most cases is likely to identify parents who have the child’s interests
at heart. Thus, we assign parenthood in part according to our beliefs
about the factual circumstances that would cause an adult to have a
special feeling toward a particular child. These beliefs connect to
cultural norms. Specifically, we have cultural norms that genetics,
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genetic definition serves the best interests of children, they say,
because as a general rule people are interested in the welfare of their
genetic offspring.10 In the context of reproductive technology,
“intended parents” refers to the people intended at the time of
conception; they would be identified in the contracts governing any
arrangements for surrogacy or donated gametes.11 Because they have
gone to the considerable effort and expense required to reproduce
using technology, they too can be trusted to protect the welfare of the
resulting children.12
Byrn & Ives intend these measures to provide each child with
legal parents as quickly and permanently as possible. They do not
want children left in legal limbo for the duration of a legal process to
determine parentage.13 They also want to avoid cases in which the
parental status assumed by the adults at the time of the birth is
questioned later in the child’s life, such as when a husband discovers
years later that he is not the genetic father.14 In order to ensure
accomplishment of these goals, Byrn & Ives propose that we should
not only define parenthood in terms genes but also institute
mandatory testing, for all children born as a result of sexual
intercourse, to make certain that each child is assigned the correct
parents at birth.15

gestation, and use of reproductive technology to create a child all give
rise to a duty toward the child and ought to kindle affection and a sense
of duty in the heart of the parent. Because the potential parents will in
most cases subscribe to the same cultural norm, we can anticipate that
assigning parenthood on these bases will generally result in choosing a
parent who is motivated to do right by the child. In addition, reliance
on a biological connection serves the pluralist interest in insulating the
distribution of children from state control.
10.

Id. at 330.

11.

Id. at 341-42.

12.

Id. at 342.

13.

Id. at 332.

14.

Id. at 339. For further discussion of such cases, see generally Brandon
James
Hoover, Establishing
the
Best
Answer
to
Paternity
Disestablishment, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 145, 161 (2011); Melanie B.
Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity,
38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 840 (2006) [hereinafter Jacobs, My Two Dads];
Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn’t Want to Be Daddy Anymore:
An Argument Against Paternity Fraud Claims, 16 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 193 (2004) [hereinafter Jacobs, When Daddy]; Niccol D.
Kording, Little White Lies That Destroy Children’s Lives: Recreating
Paternity Fraud Laws to Protect Children’s Interests, 6 J. L. & FAM.
STUD. 237, 238 (2004).

15.

Byrn & Ives, supra note 3, at 338–39.
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A regime of mandatory testing, however, would face problems of
consent, consequences, and error that should give us pause.
On the question of consent, the state has the power to compel
medical treatment of a child, but that power is not carte blanche to
require medical procedures on a child.16 Moreover, one cannot simply
perform a test on the child to identify the parents; one needs blood
from the potential parents as well. Holding parental rights hostage in
order to compel consent to the blood draws would raise serious
constitutional questions. While courts today sometimes compel DNA
testing, they can do so only on the basis of some other evidence of
either criminal guilt or denied paternity, coupled with refusal to fulfill
the responsibilities of that status.17 Even in the happy afterglow of a
successful birth, more than a few people are likely to have qualms
about state-mandated collection of DNA samples on such a massive
scale.
Suppose, however, that we have identified candidates for
parenthood and they have consented to the tests. Now suppose the
lab reports back that the presumed father is not a match for the
child. Why might that happen? Perhaps the mother conceived with
another man; perhaps, after being unable to conceive, she obtained
donated sperm in secret to protect his ego.18 Reasonable people
disagree about whether the child’s (or parents’) interests are served
by forcing this information into the open.19 But there is another
16.

See generally B. Jessie Hill, Whose Body? Whose Soul? Medical
Decision-Making on Behalf of Children and the Free Exercise Clause
Before and After Employment Division v. Smith, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
1857, 1875-77 (2011) (arguing that states should be more willing to
compel treatment and that the parental reliance on free exercise claims
to refuse treatment on behalf of a child may be unfounded).

17.

See, e.g., State v. Graham, 318 N.W.2d 853, 855-56 (Minn. 1982)
(upholding statute that provide for compulsory blood tests in paternity
actions because it was not an unwarranted exercise of police power or a
violation of substantive due process, the right to privacy, or the right of
bodily integrity); In re Paternity of D.A.A.P., 344 N.W.2d 200, 202
(Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a court may order an alleged father
to submit to a blood test only after determining at a pretrial hearing
that there is a probability that paternity can be established and that a
determination of paternity in in the best interests of the child); S.S. v.
E.S., 578 A.2d 381, 386-87 (N.J. App. Div. 1990), aff’d 590 A.2d 1188
(1991) (holding that the court is required to order a blood test if the
plaintiff shows an articulable reason for suspecting that the defendant is
the father of the child).

18.

Of course, implementation of mandatory testing would affect the
likelihood of either happening in the first place, especially the latter.

19.

Compare Byrn
protracted legal
supra note 14,
parentage, but

& Ives, supra note 3, at 330 (seeking to prevent
disputes about parentage) with Jacobs, My Two Dads,
at 837–38 (“[B]iology alone should not disestablish
rather, functional parenthood should suffice as the
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category of likely explanation: error. DNA tests are widely perceived
as infallible, but they are susceptible to multiple kinds of human and
inherent error.20 Samples get contaminated or swapped in the lab, and
criteria for a match are based on statistics, which means that there is
an inherent probabilistic element. While the error rate is low, even a
very small percentage of a very large number is itself a large number.
Massive genetic testing of infants would subject some couples to the
pain of being presented with scientific claims of deceit where in fact
none occurred. At a minimum, any state considering a testing
program should take a hard look at the probable numbers of both
false positives and false negatives.
Errors can complicate the identification of not only paternity but
also maternity. In 2002, a woman in Washington spent sixteen
months under suspicion of welfare fraud and perhaps of kidnapping
when repeated genetic testing showed her not to be the parent of her
three children.21 Resolution came only after doctors tested a new
infant immediately after watching her give birth; that child, too, was
not “hers” genetically. In our universal testing regime, we might
conclude that she was a contracted surrogate on the run, trying to
keep a baby who wasn’t “really hers.” In fact, this mother was a
chimera: her eggs contained one set of DNA inherited from her own
parents, while her blood contained a different set.22

predicate for a legal parentage determination.”); Jacobs, When Daddy,
supra note 14, at 234-35 (proposing a short statute of limitations for
challenges to paternity); Kording, supra note 14, at 266 (arguing that
genetic testing should be prohibited if a father-child relationship has
been established but mandatory if it has not).
20.

For a discussion of human errors in DNA matching, see W.C. Thomson
et al., How the Probability of a False Positive Affects the Value of DNA
Evidence, 48 J. Forensic Sci. 47, 47 (2003). For a discussion of errors
arising from comparisons across massive databases, see David H. Kaye,
Trawling DNA Databases for Partial Matches: What is the FBI Afraid
Of?, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 170 (2009).

21.

Graham Noble, Pregnancy No Proof of Motherhood; Woman Was Her
Own Twin—and the Twin Was the Mother of Her Children, LIBERTY
VOICE (Jan. 26, 2014), http://guardianlv.com/2014/01/pregnancy-noproof-of-motherhood-woman-was-her-own-twin-and-the-twin-was-themother-of-her-children/ (last visited 8/1/15). See also Evonne Lack,
Strange But True: One Person Born with Two Sets of DNA (a
chimera), BABYCENTER BLOG, http://www.babycenter.com/0_strangebut-true-one-person-born-with-two-sets-of-dna-a-chim_10364937.bc (last
visited 8/1/15) (discussing persons with multiple sets of DNA).

22.

Chimerism can occur when the fetus swaps genes with either the mother
or a twin, or when one twin is absorbed into the other. Lack, supra note
21.
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Biology, then, is not as tidy as genetic essentialism assumes; and
arguably, neither are people’s family lives. Genetic essentialism
assumes that relationships are made up of discrete categories: parent
or child, chicken or egg, a genetic tie that either is or is not, a fetus
that either is or is not a separate individual from the pregnant
woman. On the question of the status of the fetus, genetic
essentialism prompts an answer to the question of when separate life
begins: at the time of conception. By defining the new child in terms
of a set of genes, genetic essentialism suggests the model that
currently underlies anti-abortion ideology: that an embryo exists as a
new, independent human being as soon as conception occurs. As Reva
Siegel documented, the notion of the embryo and fetus as a distinct
individual suspended—even trapped—inside the pregnant woman was
a foundation of the nineteenth-century campaign to criminalize
abortion.23 Today’s abortion opponents continue to proclaim as a
scientific fact that life begins at conception.24 They insist that the
combination of chromosomes created at conception is the essence of
an individual human being, who needs only the opportunity to unfold
over the course of nine months’ gestation.25 This theory of
reproduction “systematically discount[s] women’s role in reproducing
life.”26 More broadly, this ideology underlies the conflict model of
pregnancy that has brought us the medical theory of “maternal–fetal
conflict” and the assumption that the conflict is between two distinct
individuals, the mother and the fetus.27
23.

Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: An Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 261, 288-89 (1992).

24.

See, e.g., Robert John Araujo, Abortion—From Privacy to Equality:
The Failure of the Justifications for Taking Hunan Life, 45 HOUS. L.
REV. 1737, 1785, 1789 (2009); Charles I. Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule
of Law: When Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing
in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 119, 123
(2006).

25.

I discuss this continuity between preformationism and modern antiabortion rhetoric at greater length in Jennifer S. Hendricks, Not Of
Woman Born: A Scientific Fantasy, 62 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L.
REV. 399, 428–32 (2011).

26.

Siegel, supra note 23, at 291.

27.

As I have previously outlined, “such a conflict is in one sense inherent in
every pregnancy. From the perspective of genes (rather than people),
the fetus’s genes “want” to use as much of the mother’s physiological
resources as they can, while the mother’s genes “want” to invest
appropriately in this potential offspring but also to preserve resources
for existing and possible future children. The same conflict of interest
exists, however, with respect to any particular ovum or sperm, each of
which contains genes that “want” to be reproductively successful. A
person who uses birth control or seeks an abortion is making a decision
not to create a child at a particular time in order to conserve resources

115

Health Matrix · Volume 26·Issue 1·2016
Genetic Essentialism in Family Law

This theory of conflict—of the woman and fetus as distinct
individuals—predates genetic essentialism in its modern form.
Eighteenth-century preformationists originally believed:
that the form of the fetus was contained within the mother’s egg
and that the father’s semen provided the trigger to stimulate growth.
It followed that an egg contained a series of Russian nesting dolls,
with all the generations of humanity contained originally in Eve’s
eggs. This “ovist” view of reproduction, however, was “almost
uniformly rejected” once sperm was observed and recognized as the
male analogue to the egg. The pre-existing fetus was quickly
transferred to the sperm. A famous eighteenth-century illustration of
the preformationist view depicts a tiny man squatting in the head of a
sperm, his own head either replaced by or enclosed in an oversized
bulge. This small creature was believed to take root and grow in the
mother “just as the seed does in the field.”28
The assumption that the pre-fetus resided in the sperm rather
than the egg was based on an axiom adopted by Erasmus Darwin
(grandfather of Charles): he found it unacceptable that women could
play a greater role in reproduction than men; since the woman
provided the food and nurturance of the growing fetus, it must be
that man provided the original form of the new individual.29
Far from being invented out of whole cloth, genetic essentialism
was an adaption of this preformationist view in response to the
discovery of DNA in both eggs and sperm.30 The presence of DNA in
(in a very broad sense of the word) for herself and for her family,
including existing and future children.” Hendricks, supra note 25, at 435
(citing RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 128–29 (30th anniversary
ed. 2006), and Leslie Cannold, Women, Ectogenesis, and Ethical
Theory, in ECTOGENESIS: ARTIFICIAL WOMB TECHNOLOGY AND THE
FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 50, 54 (Scott Gelfand & John R.
Shook, eds., 2006) (describing a study participant’s expression of the
view that abortion is a moral decision based on “an evaluation that
continuing the pregnancy would harm her maternal/fetal-child unit”).
Cf. Rivka M. Weinberg, Identifying and Dissolving the Non-Identity
Problem, 137 PHILOS. STUD. 3, 4 (“Future people matter a great deal,
but merely possible people don’t matter at all.”), 7 (“[E]xistence per se
is not an interest that future people have, especially since nonexistence
is not an alternative for them.”), 13–16; I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating
Reproduction: The Problem With Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 423,
439 (2011) (agreeing with general view that “‘no one is harmed in not
being created’”) (quoting F.M. Kamm, Cloning and Harm to Offspring,
4 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & POL’Y 65, 72 (2000)).
28.

Hendricks, supra note 25, at 420 (citing and quoting Nancy Tuana, The
Weaker Seed: The Sexist Bias of Reproductive Theory, 3 HYPATIA 35,
52–54 (1988)).

29.

See id.

30.

See Hendricks, supra note 25, at 421–22; Jane Maienschein, Cloning and
Stem Cell Debates in the Context of Genetic Determinism, 9 YALE J.
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eggs proved that mothers contributed equally the genetic “blueprint.”
Today, this belief in equal contribution fits comfortably with a
superficial commitment to sex equality. Historically, genetic
essentialism emerged as a somewhat grudging acknowledgement that
women are as important to reproduction as men. Note, however, that
“equal” contributions have been achieved only by ignoring what
Erasmus Darwin saw: that women quite clearly contribute more than
men in other, non-genetic capacities. Redefining genes as the essence
of parenthood enabled society to define men and women as equals by
counting only what men do, then admitting (eventually) that women
do that too.
In fact, the ideological nature of our current commitment to
genetic essentialism is illustrated by the fact that it, too, overstates
the male contribution to reproduction. Even if we only care about
genes, mothers and fathers are not equal. Both contribute nuclear
DNA for the child, but the mother also contributed mitochondrial
DNA and therefore has a greater initial role in the genetic makeup of
the embryo.31 In addition, even after the initial package of
chromosomes is fixed, decisions about how the child’s genes will be
expressed are made throughout gestation (and beyond), so the
mother’s contribution to the child’s genetic makeup continues.32
This persistent understatement even of the genetic role played by
mothers, combined with its roots in preformationism, is why I
consider genetic essentialism and its supposed sex equality to be
merely the modern mask of a claim to paternal supremacy. By
fixating on genes, genetic essentialism limits the scope of the role of
“parent” to the parts of that role that men can play. Even then it
must disregard evidence that women do more, even of what men do.
Given the obvious difference between women’s and men’s biological
role in reproduction, it is quite an accomplishment to tell a story—
and continue to adapt that story to hundreds of years of scientific
discoveries while keeping the basic message the same—that teaches
that the male role is more substantial or important, or even equal to
the female.
HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 565, 574-75 (2009) (discussing “the
preformism of genetic determinism”). As discussed above, preformation
had sufficient hold on popular imagination in the United States to play
a role in the criminalization of abortion in the nineteenth century. See
supra, text accompanying notes 23, 26 (referring to Reva Siegel’s
historical analysis of the criminalization campaign).
31.

See W. Nicholson Price, Note, Am I My Son? Human Clones and the
Modern Family, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 119, 142–43
(2010) (discussing mitochondrial DNA and explaining that, “contrary to
common belief, DNA exists in the cell outside the nucleus.”).

32.

See Hendricks, supra note 25, at 424.
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II. A Different Story
Genetic essentialism is a story about biology, the current
incarnation of a story that has adapted over time to new scientific
discoveries but remains rooted in ideology, not science, as its starting
point. One indication of the hegemony of genetic essentialism is the
difficulty we have imagining a different story to replace it. What
follows is an effort to tell a different story.
Early, single-celled organisms reproduced by mitosis, which turns
one cell into two “daughter” cells.33 In comparison to this
straightforward process, sexual reproduction presents a puzzle for
evolutionary biologists. From the female perspective, sexual
reproduction is quite costly, since it means only half of one’s offspring
can themselves reproduce.34 From the male perspective, on the other
hand, sexual reproduction is a way to pass on genes without doing the
work required to produce an entire new organism.
Although the male strategy could be described as exploitive it has
some advantages for the female organisms as well. One advantage was
that sexual reproduction shuffled the gene pool. Rather than each
organism reproducing itself identically, with occasional mutations,
genes would be traded in every generation, allowing for faster, more
efficient evolution to adapt to the environment.35 At the same time,
the competitive pressure of sexual selection could help eliminate
disadvantageous mutations more quickly.36
One could look at this process from the perspective of either sex;
traditional, patriarchal ideologies effectively adopt the perspective of
the sperm. They trace reproduction through the male line and see
women as vehicles through whom genes are passed. As an alternative,
we could trace through the female line and regard men as useful
vehicles for women to swap genes with each other.
On this view, a woman giving birth is like a cell dividing, with the
difference that humans, more complex than single-cell organisms,
collect some foreign DNA to mix in before dividing. In addition,
because humans are so much bigger than single-cell organisms, the
process results not in two daughters but in a parent and a child. The

33.

Strictly speaking, mitosis refers to “the division of a single nucleus into
two genetically identical daughter nuclei.” NEIL A. CAMPBELL ET AL.,
BIOLOGY: CONCEPTS AND CONNECTIONS G-17 (6th ed. 2009). It is one
stage of the overall process of binary fission, which produces the
complete daughter cells. Id. at 127.

34.

Carl Zimmer, On the Origin of Sexual Reproduction, 324 SCIENCE 1254,
1254 (2009). This phenomenon is known as the “twofold cost of sex.” Id.

35.

Zimmer, supra note 34, at 1256.

36.

Alyson J. Lumly et al., Sexual Selection Protects Against Extinction,
522 NATURE 470 (2015).
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process, however, can still be seen less as one individual creating
another but as one individual becoming two.
This story suggests a different answer to the question, Which
came first, the parent or the child? Indeed, it suggests a different
interpretation of the question, especially the word child. As noted
above, Byrn & Ives treat child as referring to a young human being.
In my story, child is the gender-neutral form of son or daughter, as in
daughter cell. As with the word parent, a relationship with another
person is inherent in the word child. To ask which came first is thus a
contradiction: the parent and the child can exist only in relation to
each other; thus, they come into being simultaneously.
While Byrn & Ives say the child is born and then assigned legal
parents, my model says the child and the initial parent are created
simultaneously, over the course of nine months of pregnancy, followed
by further legal assignments. Rather than envisioning a juridical
person who comes into being and then is assigned legal parents by the
state, we could see these two steps as simultaneous. This way, the
born child is never without a legal parent. The act of birth both
creates the child as a legal person and creates the formerly pregnant
woman as the child’s mother. Birth transforms a single legal person
into two legal people, a parent and a child.
What might we gain by entertaining this alternative to genetic
essentialism? First, we would move away from the notion that the
embryo is a distinct individual from the time of conception and
perhaps move toward recognizing the truth of Mary Anne Warren’s
observation, “There is room for only one person with full and equal
rights inside a single human skin.”37 This woman-centered account of
reproduction recognizes that the embryo gradually transforms from
self to other and thus the bankruptcy of maternal-fetal conflict as a
principle in moral reasoning. At the same time, it recognizes that the
process of one person dividing into two people has significance beyond
the contribution of initial genetic material. Gestation and birth
provide an additional, and to some extent independent, basis for
women to claim parental rights to children.
This sort of talk about gestation as a basis for claiming parental
rights tends to raise feminist concerns about stereotyping women as
mothers.38 Genetic essentialism is attractive to modern sensibilities in
37.

Mary Anne Warren, The Moral Significance of Birth, 4 HYPATIA 47, 63
(1989).

38.

See Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and
Fathers, 41 F.S.U. L. REV. 645, 688–92 (2014) (discussing feminist
concerns about the “new maternalism” in the context of an argument
for a labor and intent theory of parental rights) (citing Naomi Mezey &
Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Against the New Maternalism, 18 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 229 (2012)).
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part because of its superficial sex parity: it seems to avoid suggesting
that women are more closely or inherently bound up with children
than are men. It is worth noting, however, that crediting one sex with
a greater reproductive role does not in fact lead inexorably to that
sex’s subordination, or even to that sex being assigned more
responsibility for child rearing. For most of western history, men have
claimed a greater, more important role in the creation of offspring
than they in fact play, and their historical claims provide the
foundation for genetic essentialism. Somehow, none of this led
Erasmus Darwin, or anyone else at the time, to suggest that men
ought to change a few more diapers. Either story about reproduction
can be used to rationalize sex-based subordination, and it is the
genetic essentialist story that demonstrably traces its roots to
patriarchal ideology.
Still, it is true that a downside to my story about reproduction is
that it can be taken to suggest that gestation creates a unique bond
between mother and child that is superior to other kinds of
parenthood. That is why I offer it as a counterweight to genetic
essentialism rather than as a replacement for all other paths to
parenthood. If I were in charge of the rules for establishing
parenthood, a child’s birth mother would be her initial, automatic
parent.39 The mother could maintain that status on her own,
relinquish it through adoption, or invite others to join her by forming
a parental relationship with the child; and certainly, the other genetic
parent would have a special claim to do so.40 Under this system, the
child is assured of a parent immediately upon birth, but that parent
remains free to choose among a variety of possible family forms; the
system thus avoids the heteronormativity of genetic essentialism.
When the birth mother brings in additional parents, they attain
legal parenthood through doctrines such as the biology-plusrelationship test for genetic fathers and second-parent adoption or de
facto parenthood for non-biological parents.41 All of these paths
39.

Cf. E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity:
Evidence of the Biological Mother’s Consent to the Biological Father’s
Co-Parenting of Her Child, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 97, 99 (2006) (describing
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433–44 (2006). For details on de facto (or psychological) parent
doctrine, see Emily B. Gelmann, What About Susan? Three’s Company,
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involve a commitment to providing care for the child that is loosely
comparable to gestation. I do not claim that the birth mother is
uniquely able to parent the child. Rather, my claim is that by the
time of birth she, and only she, has provided the sort of parental care
that in other contexts serves to establish legal parenthood. She should
therefore be recognized as the initial legal parent. I do not claim that
becoming a parent by giving birth is “worth” more than other paths,
but I do think we need to remember that it also is not less.
One feature that gestational parenthood shares with all these
other paths to parenthood—and genetic essentialism lacks—is the
particularity of the relationship between the parent and child.
Relationship-based paths to parenthood are unavoidably particular,
concrete, and personal. That is, gestational parenthood is not an
abstract connection to the idea of a child, or even the idea of a child
who shares one’s genes. That is why, for example, I believe the claims
of a birth mother outweigh the claims of other prospective parents to
whom she may have “signed over” the child before the birth. The
pain of wanting and expecting a child, only to be denied at the last
moment, can be severe, but it is still founded on desire for “a child”
that has only an abstract relationship to attachment to “this child.”
To illustrate what I mean by an individuated relationship,
consider the case of Fasano v. Perry-Rodgers.42 Fasano involved two
couples who were both undergoing in vitro fertilization at the same
clinic. Donna Fasano successfully became pregnant; Deborah PerryRogers did not. However, it turned out that Fasano had mistakenly
been given some of the Perry-Rogerses’ embryos. When she gave birth
to two boys, one was genetically related to her and her husband while
the other was the genetic son of the Perry-Rogerses. The case
presented the question of how to determine parenthood in pure form,
since unlike in surrogacy cases there was no contract, and Fasano had
never agreed to gestate a child for anyone else. After a bitter custody
battle, the court declared that each boy was the legal child of his
genetic parents, with no rights to visitation or other legal status for
the other couple.43 Despite rhetorically claiming that genetics were not
determinative, the court reasoned in the register of genetic
essentialism that Fasano’s “nominal parenthood” of the second child
should have been corrected “before the development of a parental
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relationship,” which the court assumed could only have happened
after the birth.44
One interesting feature of Fasano is that it provides an
opportunity to test some intuitions about how we think about the
children in these disputes. Consider, for example, that the rule the
court adopted would presumably have applied even if there had been
only one child, one who was genetically linked to the Perry-Rogerses.
Many people feel at least a twinge of relief that, in the actual case,
Fasano gave birth to “twins.” Despite the tragic circumstances, at
least she ended up with a baby, as did the Perry-Rogerses. For some
people, the fact that there were two babies tilts the equities against
the Fasanos. It seems selfish for them to have tried to keep both. For
once, King Solomon didn’t have to split the baby, because there were
enough to go around. This seemingly happy outcome may even have
helped the court reach the conclusion that it did.
This common reaction to the facts of Fasano is a good indication
that some part of us views babies as fungible commodities. Most
parents of multiple children insist that their children are not
interchangeable in their hearts. The loss of a child is not diminished
by the consolation that one still has one left. The parent of multiple
children has not divided her love into pieces, safely storing each in a
separate basket to spread the risk of loss.45 Why would we expect
Donna Fasano to feel differently? I think part of the answer is that we
too readily discount the parental relationship formed through
gestation. Genetic essentialism elevated the Perry-Rogerses abstract
desire for a child of their genes above the concrete, blood and flesh
relationship between the child and Fasano.
Fasano, then, illustrates what is lost when parenthood is defined
through the lens of genetic essentialism, an ideology that places
ownership and control of one’s genes above the more tangible and
emotion-based ties that arise from a parent’s direct, physical
caretaking for a child, including through gestation. Genetic
essentialism does not flow from historically recent scientific discoveries
about reproduction. Rather, it is the modern face of a male
supremacist ideology that predates and has merely adapted to the
current state of our knowledge of biology. While genetic connections
will likely always be meaningful to parents and children alike, they
need not be the sine qua non of parenthood.
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